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WAR BY PROXY: LEGAL AND MORAL DUTIES OF 'OTHER ACTORS'
DERIVED FROM GOVERNMENT AFFILIATION*
Michael A. Newton t
The theme for this panel is outsourcing torture, which of course
harkens back to a contractual model in conducting our campaign against
those who would commit terrorist acts. I want to do something that I realize
may be a bit unusual in this setting; I want to focus on the substantive
framework of the laws themselves with regard to the regulation of private
contractors who are suspected of having committed torture. My premise,
which I recognize is shared by most of you, is that the United States gov-
ernment cannot simply relegate its duty to protect the American people to
friends and allies. By the same token, neither can our government relinquish
its legal and moral obligations to ensure the proper treatment of persons in
our custody to proxies acting on its behalf. This difficulty is most pointedly
raised in recent operations by the presence of paid civilian contractors who
are charged with sensitive aspects of our military operations, yet operate
beyond the boundaries of established military lines of authority.
You have doubtless all seen the commentary about our presence in
a new paradigm of warfare. That is certainly true in the political and legal
sense. In the context of dealing with civilian contractors supporting the war
effort, it is equally true. The reliance on paid civilian contractors is a direct
consequence of the fact that our military structure is roughly 40% smaller
than it was at the height of the Cold War. After the United States military,
the second largest deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq today are the hun-
dreds of contractors funded by the United States government. The reality at
present is that the legal framework for regulating the conduct of civilian
contractors is not a tightly woven and interconnected whole. This, in turn,
raises the real potential that paid civilian contractors, who earn salaries that
seem astronomical to those in uniform, actually undermine our war effort
through undisciplined and illegal acts beyond the control of the affected
military commanders.
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Torture and the War on Terror" at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox Inter-
national Law Center, Oct. 7, 2005.
t Acting Associate Clinical Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. Professor New-
ton may be reached at mike.newton@vanderbilt.edu. The opinions and conclusions of this
paper, as well as its flaws, are solely attributable to the author.
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The failure to implement a comprehensive mechanism for control-
ling and punishing the conduct of private contractors could be portrayed by
our enemies as a hypocritical convenience. On the one hand, our rhetoric
and ideals are soaring. The National Security Strategy, for example, postu-
lates that America's role in the world is to "defend liberty and justice be-
cause these principles are right and true for all people everywhere." 1 Our
national policy obligates America to "stand firmly for the nonnegotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of
the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women;
religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property."2 President
Bush used the United Nations pulpit to reiterate the United States policy on
the prevention of torture to an attentive world audience:
The United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture
and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join
with the United States and the community of law-abiding nations in pro-
hibiting, investigating, and prosecuting all'acts of torture and in undertak-
ing to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment. 3
On the other hand, the worldwide broadcasts of Americans mis-
treating Iraqi detainees during the night watch at Abu Ghraib exemplified a
gulf between American ideals and American actions, at least in that place at
that time. While it represented a leadership failure for the military chain of
command, Abu Ghraib also demonstrated the cultural fissures between the
civilian contractor and the military professional. Military officers have been
uncomfortable with interrogations of detainees by non-military actors in
areas that exclude military personnel.4 The Final Report of the Independent
Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations concluded
that civilian "[c]ontractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib."5
1 THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
2 Id.
3 George W. Bush, Statement at the United Nations International Day in Support of Vic-
tims of Torture (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003
/06/20030626-3.html (declaring a "strong solidarity with torture victims across the world"
and noting that "[t]orture anywhere is an affront to human dignity everywhere.").
4 See generally Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture oflraqi Detainees by
the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division, 17 HuM. RTs. WATCH (2005), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/us0905.pdf. See also Daniel Bergner, The Other Army,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2005, at 29 (commenting on the erosion of some of the most elite
sectors of the U.S. military occasioned by the rise of private contractors and the cultural and
financial gaps between active duty soldiers and corporate employees).
5 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD
DETENTION OPERATIONS [hereinafter Schlesinger Report], reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG
& JOSHUA L. DRATEL, THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 942 (2005) [herein-
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Military professionals were, on the whole, more affected and more
appalled by the revelations from inside the Abu Ghraib prison complex than
any other identifiable entity because of the pervasive culture of discipline
and dedication to duty within military channels. With some notable excep-
tions, this culture is not present in the ranks of civilian contractors. Soldiers
were acutely embarrassed by the worldwide revelations, and angry that
those images provided fodder for enemies who portray the American mili-
tary as arrogant and lawless. The exploitation of those images by America's
enemies made daily patrols more dangerous and tarnished the sacrifices of
comrades. Service members who mistreat civilian detainees are subject to
prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but the civilian
contractors who contributed to the crimes at Abu Ghraib were subject only
to official reprimands, removal of their security clearances, and the termina-
tion of employment.6
This symposium is an excellent opportunity to gauge our progress
in overcoming the obstacles that hinder efforts to protect American lives
and property. As we fight this asymmetric war, our enemies hide behind a
twisted set of principles and undemocratic ideals. As a result, the western
world is simultaneously faced with two distinct adversaries: 1) the armed
civilians who have unlawfully taken up arms to direct violent acts against
western interests, 7 and 2) the radicals who sustain a pernicious and wide-
spread effort to foster a belief system that produces terrorist acts. Acts of
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of those who come into
American custody and control provide fodder for both sets of enemies and
would further undermine our national security objectives.* Reflecting the
overarching truths of an interdependent world, the cornerstone of the strug-
gle against terrorist extremism has been the presidential declaration on Sep-
tember 20, 2001 that the campaign against "international terrorism"8 is
after TORTURE PAPERS]. See also SEYMOUR M. HERSCH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD
FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 32-33 (2004).
6 MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, paras. 11-12, reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 405 [hereinaf-
ter TAGUBA REPORT].
7 See Michael Newton, Unlawful Belligerency After September 11: History Revisited and
Law Revised, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS?: APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR TO 21ST CENTURY
CONFLICTS 75 (DAVID WIPPMAN & MATTHEW EVANGELISTA eds., 2005); see also Kenneth
Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle
Over Legitimacy, HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH
(2005), available at http://www.hpcr.org/pdfs/OccasionalPaper2.pdf.
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2000) (reflecting amendments made in the PATRIOT ACT
and providing that for the purposes of the federal criminal law) --
(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that-
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
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more than just a fight to secure American freedoms because it is "civiliza-
tion's fight" waged on behalf of civilized peoples who "believe in progress
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom." 9
The presidential premise is identical to that intuitively embodied in
the title of this panel: a deliberate policy to outsource torture would be in-
imical to our values and counterproductive to the efforts to defeat transna-
tional networks of terrorists. While we may be at liberty to outsource our
yard work or our automobile repairs in our private lives, deliberate efforts to
contract out the use of torture on behalf of the United States would substi-
tute a pretext of lawfulness even as other actors or states willingly violate
fundamental international norms at our request to serve our interests. Such
deliberate efforts would be a sham in practice and make a mockery of our
stated commitment to upholding the basic principles of human liberty and
dignity, not to mention our binding treaty commitments.
On this score, the Torture Convention,10 which entered into force
for the United States on November 20, 1994, is precise and on-point. Arti-
cles 2, 3, and 4 of the Convention impose obligations to implement sweep-
ing measures to prevent torture committed by any actor under any circum-
stances, and to have off the shelf criminal sanctions to punish violations, no
matter where the offense was committed:
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnap-
ping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are ac-
complished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
9 George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347
(Sept. 30, 2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname =
200 l_presidential_documents&docid=pd24se0 ltxt-26.pdf [hereinafter Joint Session].
10 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/




1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial
or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its juris-
diction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture. 1
Article 312
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations in-
cluding, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consis-
tent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.' 
3
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and
to an act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in
torture.
11 Id. art. 2.
12 Responding to allegations that the United States is violating its Article 3 obligations,
President Bush flatly declared on January 27, 2005 that "torture is never acceptable, nor do
we hand over people to countries that do torture." Jane Meyer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. See also U.S.: Don't Send Detainees Back to China, HUM.
RTs. WATCH (2003), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/ll/26/china6539.htm.
Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes echoed this policy by writing that:
Should an individual be transferred to another country to be held on behalf of the
United States, or should we otherwise deem it appropriate, United States policy is
to obtain specific assurances from the receiving country that it will not torture the
individual being transferred to that country. We can assure you that the United
States would take steps to investigate credible allegations of torture and take ap-
propriate action if there were reason to believe that those assurances were not be-
ing honored.
Id. (citing Letter from William Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. to Patrick Leahy,
Senator, U.S. Senate (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-
to-leahy.pdf).
13 Torture Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
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2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature. 14
For the purposes of this panel, it is significant that there is no limi-
tation on the United States obligation to implement the scope of Articles 2,
3, or 4 although the instrument of ratification 15 contained a series of impor-
tant declarations, reservations, and understandings relevant to the United
States implementation of the Torture Convention as a whole. In particular,
the broad responsibility to implement a range of "effective legislative, ad-
ministrative, judicial or other measures" found in Article 216 creates a legal
and moral imperative to take action rather than simply hope for the best.
Military contractors who are in contact with detainees raise particular legal
and moral problems in implementing U.S. treaty obligations because they
operate essentially as free agents outside the scope of military authority and
control. Private contractors are not within the military chain of command.
Even though they operate in general support of the military mission, they
may or may not obey the guidance of a local commander. They are, never-
theless, operating with the financial and operational sponsorship of the
United States government. They are quasi-officials whose very presence in
the area of operations depends on the largesse of our contracting officials.
During their deployment, civilian contractors operate under a paral-
lel system of private control that is divorced from the hierarchical model
needed to ensure a common baseline of professionalism, discipline, and
training. Derived from the basic principles of war recognized across the
globe, the principle of "Objective" obliges commanders to direct every op-
eration towards a defined, decisive, and attainable end state. 17 The overall
mission is subdivided into specified tasks, which are clear and imperative
directives to the military commander, and implied tasks, which are those
subordinate tasks necessarily implied in support of the specified tasks.
American combatant commanders accordingly issue "authoritative direction
to subordinate commands and forces" as required to accomplish the as-
14 Id. art. 4.
15 See U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings to the Convention Against
Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136
Cong. Rec. S17, 486 (1990) (the key reservation is an interpretive rule that "the obligation
under Article 16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" applies only as that term
is construed under the "Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments" to the United States
Constitution). See also http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatyl2_asp.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2006).
16 Torture Convention, supra note 10, art. 2.
17 The Principles of War crystallized as a military doctrine around the world around 1800.
The accepted principles are: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Forces, Maneuver,
Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 557 (John Whiteclay Chambers III ed., 1999).
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signed missions within the theater. 8 This four-star command authority nec-
essarily entails decisions "over all aspects of military operations, joint train-
ing, and logistics" and the organization and assignment of forces to the ap-
propriate chain of military command. 19 For example, after an exhaustive
review of interrogation techniques, military doctrine is expanding "from
two publications to eight... because [American] soldiers have found them-
selves in a very challenging and new environment., 20 There are times when
soldiers may complain about cold, rigid, structured military discipline, but
when the nation confronts the operational need to prevent torture, and cruel
or inhumane treatment, it is a good thing to have a commander specifically
empowered with a legal duty to instill standards of professionalism. The flip
side of command authority is the correlative responsibility to punish those
who ignore those lawful orders and regulations. You lose all of that unity of
command the second you take a wad of money and pay some person from
Blackwater, or Executive Outcome, or California Microwave or Triple Can-
opy to operate in the same area.
Today is a particularly appropriate time to focus on the current
framework for addressing the conduct of non-military actors. On October 3,
2005, Senator John McCain offered a notable amendment to the pending
Fiscal Year 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. 2' The text is
important because in substance it seeks to fill the gap that I have spoken of
today by creating a uniform worldwide standard for the treatment of all per-
sons in United States custody, regardless of whether they are held by civil-
ian or military officials acting on behalf of the United States. If enacted in
its present form, the McCain amendment would provide as follows:
UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS
UNDER THE DETENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-No person in the custody or under the effective con-
trol of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of
18 10 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1994).
19 id.
20 Colonel Pete Champagne, Army Deputy Provost Marshal, U.S. Dep't of Def., Dep't of
Def. Briefing on Detention Operations and Interrogation Techniques (Mar. 10, 2005),
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050310-2262.html. In addition, other offi-
cials who participated in this briefing described other initiatives resulting from the Depart-
ment of Defense review of interrogation techniques, which involved over 800 interviews,
review of thousands of pages of documentary evidence, and careful analysis of the seventy
documented cases of detainee abuse. See generally Department of Defense Briefing on De-
tention Operations and Interrogation Techniques, supra.
21 151 CONG. REc. SI0, 908-9 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2005 ) (submitting amendment to the
Fiscal Year 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act tabled by Senator McCain on
behalf of himself and Senators Graham, Hagel, Smith, and Collins).
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Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interroga-
tion not authorized by and listed in the United States Army Field Manual
on Intelligence Interrogation.
(b) APPLICABILITY.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to with respect to
any person in the custody or under the effective control of the Department
of Defense pursuant to a criminal law or immigration law of the United
States.
(c) CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
fect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the
custody or under the physical jurisdiction of the United States.
PROHIBITION ON CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY
OR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL.-No individual in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or
physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.
(b) CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to im-
pose any geographical limitation on the applicability of the prohibition
against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment under this
section.
(c) LIMITATION ON SUPERSEDURE.-The provisions of this section
shall not be superseded, except by a provision of law enacted after the date
of the enactment of this Act which specifically repeals, modifies, or super-
sedes the provisions of this section.
(d) CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT DEFINED.-In this section, the term "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel, unusual, and inhu-
mane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in
the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, In-





In one sense, the McCain language merely restates the truism that
the treaty obligations of the United States attach to those acting in an offi-
cial capacity to detain or interrogate detainees. At the same time, the
amendment would create a statutory extrapolation from existing military
authority to the private actors who enter the operational area because it is
their job rather than their military duty. I should note in passing that there is
a school of thought that might maintain that any "effort by Congress to
regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Consti-
tution's sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the Presi-
dent., 23 Nevertheless, the application of Army doctrine to all non-military
actors who take custody of detainees in areas under the effective control of
the military would lend a consistency to our national practice that has been
heretofore lacking.
The McCain language would address the reality that military com-
manders often have little or no effective control over civilian contractors
working in their area, and consequently have a decreased ability to promul-
gate and enforce uniform professional standards. The United States military
provides the world's foremost training base and an accompanying set of
operational norms that have been emulated around the world. Congress ex-
pressly noted that "the vast majority of members of the Armed Forces have
upheld the highest possible standards of professionalism and morality in the
face of illegal tactics and terrorist attacks and attempts on their lives."24
Abu Ghraib demonstrated that the modem dependence on civilian
contractors has weakened the sense of pervasive professionalism across the
Armed Forces and the uniformity of practice that should be assumed in this
important area. To ensure operational consistency across all the uniformed
branches, the Secretary of the Army is the executive agent for implementing
our treaty obligations regarding the treatment of persons in United States
military custody. 25 The McCain language would expand the Army regula-
23 U.S. Dep' of Def. Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War
on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Mar.
6, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 5, at 259-60 (basing this assertion on the
stated premise that "[t]here can be little doubt that intelligence operations, such as the deten-
tion and interrogation of enemy combatants and leaders, are both necessary and proper for
the effective conduct of a military campaign"), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf.
24 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 1091, 118 Stat. 2067 (2004).
25 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, CJCSI 3290.0 1A, Program
for Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained
Personnel, Oct. 15, 2000. See also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIvE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF
WAR PROGRAM, para 1.2 (1998) [hereinafter DOD DIR. 5100.77] (requiring that United
States Armed Forces shall "comply with the law of war" in the conduct of military opera-
tions and related activities in "armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized"),
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html2/d510077x.htm.
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tion to provide the baseline for assessing the legality of the actions of non-
military actors as well. Existing military doctrine prohibiting mistreatment
of detainees is grounded in proven operational realities, and prescient,
pragmatic considerations that are apparent in the aftermath of the Abu
Ghraib debacle:
Experience indicates that the use of prohibited techniques is not necessary
to gain the cooperation of interrogation sources. Use of torture and other
illegal methods is a poor technique that yields unreliable results, may
damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say
whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.
Revelation of use of torture by US personnel will bring discredit upon the
US and its armed forces while undermining domestic and international
support for the war effort. It may also place US and allied personnel in en-
emy hands at greater risk of abuse by their captors. Conversely, knowing
the enemy has abused US and allied PWs [the military abbreviation for
prisoners of war] does not justify using methods of interrogation prohib-
ited by the GWS [Geneva Convention on Wounded and Sick], GPW [Ge-
neva Convention on Prisoners of War], or GC [Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons], and US policy. 26
The pragmatic basis for the Army regulation applies whether the
detainee is being interrogated by military personnel or by private civilian
contractors. With regard to interrogation techniques, the doctrine is explicit
that "illegal acts are not authorized and will not be condoned by the US
Army."'27 Army Field Manual 34-52 goes on to list the specific provisions
of military law that could be violated by unlawful interrogations and warns
that the Geneva Conventions and Department of Defense policy "expressly
prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental tor-
ture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid
to interrogation., 28 This stark policy statement illustrates the powerful pro-
fessional undercurrent that animates United States military detention opera-
tions and generally prevents mistreatment of enemy personnel in United
States military custody. While it is a promising development on its face, the
McCain Amendment should not be viewed in isolation.
The second reason why this is a particularly appropriate topic this
morning is that Department of Defense procedural policy is finally begin-
ning to catch up with events on the ground. One of the pertinent observa-
tions of the Schlesinger Report was that 35% of the contractors employed as
interrogators had received no formal training in military interrogation tech-






niques, policy or doctrine. Though some civilians interrogating detainees
had previous military training, the systematic "[o]versight of contractor
personnel and activities was not sufficient to ensure intelligence operations
fell within the law and the authorized chain of command., 29 The compre-
hensive review of detainee policy recognized that the "[c]ontinued use of
contractors will be required, but contracts must clearly specify the technical
requirements and personnel qualifications, experience, and training needed.
They should also be developed and administered in such a[] way as to pro-
vide the necessary oversight and management.'
30
Congress responded to these insights with alacrity. Section 1092 of
the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year for 2005 required the Secre-
tary of Defense to oversee the implementation of uniform procedures to
ensure that "all persons acting on behalf of the Armed Forces or within fa-
cilities of the Armed Forces, treat persons detained by the United States
Government in a humane manner consistent with the international obliga-
tions and laws of the United States., 31 This statutory mandate further re-
quired "[t]he Secretary of Defense [to] certify that all Federal employees
and civilian contractors engaged in the handling or interrogation of indi-
viduals detained by the Department of Defense on behalf of the United
States Government have fulfilled an annual training requirement on the law
of war, the Geneva Conventions, and the obligations of the United States
under international law."3 2 Section 1092 created a statutory obligation that
the newly promulgated policies include procedures for:
(1) Ensuring that each commander of a Department of Defense detention
facility or interrogation facility-
(A) provides all assigned personnel with training, and documented ac-
knowledgment of receiving training, regarding the law of war, including
the Geneva Conventions; and
(B) establishes standard operating procedures for the treatment of detain-
ees.
(2) Ensuring that each Department of Defense contract in which contract
personnel in the course of their duties interact with individuals detained by
the Department of Defense on behalf of the United States Government in-
clude a requirement that such contract personnel have received training,
and documented acknowledgment of receiving training, regarding the in-
ternational obligations and laws of the United States applicable to the de-
tention of personnel.
29 Schlesinger Report, supra note 5, at 942.
30 id.
31 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 1092, 118 Stat. 2067 (2004).
32 id.
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(3) Providing all detainees with information, in their own language, of the
applicable protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions.
(4) Conducting periodic unannounced and announced inspections of deten-
tion facilities in order to provide continued oversight of interrogation and
detention operations.
(5) Ensuring that, to the maximum extent practicable, detainees and deten-
tion facility personnel of a different gender are not alone together.33
Section 1092 was a reasonable response by Congress to the evi-
dence that contractors were operating as free agents outside the military
chain of command. Doubly compounding that problem is the present lack of
training in uniform standards or practices. Congress stated that we are not
satisfied with that and ordered the Secretary of Defense to address a sys-
tematic problem that has grave implications for our national security, not to
mention our treaty compliance. Nearly a year later on September 1, 2005,
the Department of Defense published an interim rule to the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 34 that was the first tangible
step towards operationalizing the goals set by Congress. 35
In order to process a United States government contract, all con-
tracting officers must now include a contractual requirement that, prior to
interacting with detainees, all civilians will be trained in the "international
obligations and laws of the United States applicable to the detention of per-
sonnel, including the Geneva Conventions. 36 This contractual training re-
quirement should, in theory, provide uniformity of practice because the
military combatant commander is responsible for providing the training
(and for annual retraining of the appropriate personnel). The contractor has
a corresponding duty to include the same contractual clause in any subcon-
tracts. The combatant commander will issue a training receipt document to
personnel who receive such training, and the individual employee is re-
quired to retain possession of that receipt. This comprehensive approach
was finally formalized within the contractor community on September 12,
2005 through a memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
33 id.
34 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Training for Contractor Personnel
Interacting with Detainees, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,032, 52,033 (Sept. 1, 2005) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 237 and 252), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/changenotice/
archive/2005/20050901/05-17347.htm.
35 Training for Contractor Personnel Interacting with Detainees, 70 Fed. Reg. at 52,033.
For the broader context of these terms see also 48 C.F.R. Parts 232 and 252.
36 48 C.F.R. § 252.237-7019 (2004) (implementing the results of DFARS Case 2005 D007
as embodied in DFARS 252.237-7019).
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quisition, Logistics, and Technology which required immediate incorpora-
tion of the new DFARS into "each affected solicitation and contract. 3 7
On paper, the newly implemented system represents a distinct shift
in the direction of consistent standards accompanied by motivated adher-
ence. Contractors and their employees have a major financial incentive to
check the training block, then move on to the bank. Linking the training
requirement to contract solicitation and management is a tangible improve-
ment over the void that helped cause Abu Ghraib. The four star combatant
commanders will implement these standards along with their other respon-
sibilities. Nevertheless, in my view, we should expect to see a gap remain-
ing between the intentions of the policies as drafted and their effect with
regard to practices on the ground. There is no obligation for subsequent
monitoring of contractor conduct. Apart from the training requirement,
which many contractors will see as a necessary evil to be overcome as an
unpleasant obstacle to a fat paycheck, there are no standards for administer-
ing the contractual terminology. In addition, the broad duty to train in the
relevant international and domestic laws is not accompanied by any re-
quirement for substantive consistency between combatant commands,
which could lead to very different standards and interpretations across re-
gional commands. Lastly, the DFARS clause itself implements only a por-
tion of the broader aspirational goals found in Section 1092. This is the
situation as we meet today.
Of course, the logical corollary to training contractors is the ques-
tion of how contractor misconduct can be addressed. After Abu Graib, this
is not a theoretical matter. The economic incentives that should motivate
contractor compliance with the established legal norms are insufficient be-
cause the universe of companies and individuals who are prepared to deploy
and serve alongside the deployed military force remains small. The free
market cannot effectively regulate contractor conduct. Regardless of the
documented crimes committed by DynCorp employees in the Balkans, for
example, the firm received a contract to train Iraqi police that could be
worth as much as US$250 million. 38 Rather than the inherent lines of com-
mand authority, "[t]he contract [itself] is the principal legal basis for the
37 Memorandum from Kenneth J. Krieg, Under Sec'y of Def. for Acquisition, Logistics, &





38 P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and In-
ternational Law, 42 COLUrM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 525 (2004) (giving an example of one of
the most egregious cases of contractor misconduct, which involved a supervisor who made
videotapes of himself raping women - the man was never prosecuted).
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relationship between the Department of Defense and the contractor."39 The
military commander accordingly has extremely limited power to compel
compliance with relevant legal standards, and even less power to discipline
disobedient civilians. The enforcement question is somewhat eased by the
knowledge that the perpetrator should be in possession of a signed receipt
acknowledging training in the relevant international and domestic norms
related to the treatment of detainees. This receipt will most certainly assist
prosecutors in meeting the mens rea requirements of the particular charged
offense.
However, the current framework for charging contractor miscon-
duct is little more than a patchwork quilt of overlapping measures. While
the problem of contractor misconduct remains and perhaps grows as the
stress of sustained operations mounts, the imprecise parameters of the exist-
ing enforcement framework threaten to undermine the military mission as
never before. I want to close by briefly surveying the vagaries of the statu-
tory tools for punishing civilian contractors. As already noted, military
commanders cannot enforce the legal norms vis 6 vis civilian contractors.
Despite the worldwide application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), and the specific authority to punish individuals for disobeying the
lawful orders of superior authorities, the military commander cannot punish
civilian contractors unless they are "serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field.",40 A formal declaration of war by Congress is the
necessary legal predicate for a commander to use the UCMJ to impose
criminal liability over civilian contractors. 4' As a result, only the Depart-
ment of Justice may prosecute civilians who deploy based on a contractual
relationship with the Department of Defense during the current global cam-
paign against terrorists.
Though the Justice Department can select from a menu of statutory
options created to establish criminal jurisdiction over civilian contractors,
closer examination of each reveals a series of quirks and wrinkles that in the
aggregate make effective enforcement difficult. The principal tool that is
often mentioned is the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).42
Congress passed MEJA in 2000 as a comprehensive effort to close the "ju-
risdictional gap" over civilians operating alongside military forces outside
the United States.43 MEJA amended the federal criminal code to provide
39 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 3020.41, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO
ACCOMPANY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, para. 6.1.4 (2005) [hereinafter DOD INSTRUCTION
3020.411.
4o 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (1996).
41 DoD INSTRUCTION 3020.41, supra note 39, para. 6.3.3.
42 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000).
43 H.R. Rep. No. 106-778, at 5 (2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106_cong reports&docid=f:hr778p 1.106.pdf.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons, both United States citizens and
foreign nationals, who commit criminal acts "while employed by or [other-
wise] accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States." 44 MEJA
can only be implemented in accordance with the extraordinarily complex
and difficult procedural guidance that the Department of Defense promul-
gated on March 3, 2005.45 MEJA has never been successfully used to prose-
cute a civilian contractor despite its purpose as the all-encompassing tool for
regulating contractor misconduct.
Last fall, Congress broadened MEJA to remedy a major textual
limitation to its original language. As enacted in 2000, MEJA applied with
regard to civilians employed by the Department of Defense and to those
hired pursuant to contracts awarded by the Department of Defense. The
plethora of contracts awarded to other governmental agencies meant that
military contractors employed by other agencies who were assigned to inter-
rogate or handle detainees remained beyond the scope of its criminal cover-
age. Congress accordingly extended coverage of the act to include Depart-
ment of Defense contractors as well as civilians working under any contract
awarded by "any other Federal agency, or any provisional authority, to the
extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department
of Defense overseas.,
46
Nevertheless, as currently drafted, MEJA is at best a clunky tool for
punishing contractor misconduct because by its terms it applies to felonies
committed "outside the United States." As used in the statute, the geo-
graphical element "outside the United States" captures the intent of the
drafters to exclude conduct committed within the special maritime and terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. In other words, conduct committed
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States is
outside the scope of MEJA. This is a fatal flaw because one of the key pro-
visions of the PATRIOT Act enacted in the wake of September 11 was to
expand the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
to include the "premises of any diplomatic, consular, military, or other
United States government missions or entities in foreign states, including
the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or
used for the purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of owner-
44 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a)(1) (2000). MEJA also closed the preexisting jurisdictional loophole
that allowed military personnel to escape prosecution for acts committed while subject to the
UCMJ simply by reverting to civilian status at the end of their service.
45 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5525.11, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
EMPLOYED By OR ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES,
CERTAIN SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS (2005).
46 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 1088(A)(i)(II) (2004) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(A)).
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ship.",47 These are precisely the places that mistreatment of foreign nationals
at the hands of civilian contractors could occur.
The amendment does specify that the expansion of special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction "does not apply with respect to an offense com-
mitted by a person" described in MEJA.48 This is circular reasoning that
clouds the utility of MEJA. The conduct is criminal under MEJA precisely
because it is defined in contradistinction to the special maritime and territo-
rial jurisdiction. It is extremely quirky for a prosecutor to be forced to argue
that a particular location in the world is within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction for one purpose, while being simultaneously excluded
for another statutory purpose. Moreover, exclusion of "an offense commit-
ted by a person" described in MEJA from the definition of special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction sets up a double negative. Conduct that is within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction is not an "offense" covered
by MEJA, so a court could logically find itself foreclosed from enforcing its
provisions against the described contractors. These oddities perhaps explain
why MEJA has not been applied to regulate contractor misconduct to date.
Congress recognized and remedied a parallel problem in the portion
of the federal criminal code implementing the Torture Convention. The Tor-
ture Convention Implementation Act made it a federal crime for any person
to commit acts proscribed by the treaty "outside the United States., 49 As
originally enacted, the statute excluded conduct occurring within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which would have
effectively nullified its applicability with regard to civilian conduct in sup-
port of military operations following the PATRIOT Act amendment. This
inconsistency was addressed and solved last fall by simply defining the cov-
erage of the Torture Convention Implementation Act in geographic terms
rather than legal terms .50 At the same time, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A remains an
unwieldy weapon for prosecutors because it requires a showing that the
contractor "acted under the color of law" with the specific intent "to inflict
severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 51
47 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 377, 115 Stat. 272, 377
(2001) (adding a new paragraph 9 to the definition of special maritime and territorial juris-
diction codified at 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2005)).
48 id.
41 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (1994).
50 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 1089 (2004) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2340(3) to define "United States" as the
several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, territo-
ries, and possessions of the United States.).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (1994). The statutory definition of torture is drawn directly from
the Torture Convention. See Torture Convention, supra note 10.
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In the final analysis, the normal provisions of the federal criminal
code seem to be the best fit for punishing civilian contractors who mistreat
detainees. Every place around the world where civilian contractors are in
support of military operations arguably falls within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction under the PATRIOT ACT. The indictment and pend-
ing trial of a CIA contractor named David A. Passaro in the Eastern District
of North Carolina is the first use of this expanded federal punitive power.
As many of you are aware, Passaro is charged with assaulting an Afghan
citizen who had voluntarily turned himself in for questioning related to a
rocket attack near the Asadabad military base in Kunar province, Afghani-
stan. In announcing the prosecution, the Assistant Attorney General said
that "[t]he criminal abuse of persons detained in the global war on terrorism
will not be tolerated., 52
Thus, the problem of contractor abuse is growing larger as we de-
ploy more and more contractors, and pay them more and more money, and
put more and more pressure on them to earn that money by producing ac-
tionable intelligence. As Senator Levin noted with reference to the crimes at
Abu Ghraib, "we are a Nation of laws" and the acts of misconduct by those
acting on behalf of United States interests have "undermined the hard work
and sacrifices of our military and tarnished the image of our armed
forces. '' 53 The operational mechanisms for inculcating and enforcing our
justifiable abhorrence to torture committed in the name of the United States
are only now maturing. If we fail to respond and remediate future miscon-
duct at the hands of civilian contractors the American people will be further
endangered. The United States is a nation that clings to its values and stan-
dards of decency in an otherwise hostile world, and that is why we cannot
be true to our moral and legal obligations by permitting torture.
52 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, CIA Contractor Indicted for Assaulting Detainee
Held at U.S. Base in Afghanistan (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr
/2004/June/04_crm_414.htm.
" 150 CONG. REC. SI1, 947 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Levin).
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